The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently provided guidance regarding Section 16(b) short-swing profit liability for corporate issuers and institutional investors. On July 7, 2026, the court affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by the post-bankruptcy successor to Bed Bath & Beyond (“BBB”), which sought to recover more than $310 million in alleged short-swing profits from an institutional investor.
The Second Circuit held that contractual beneficial ownership blockers were effective and enforceable. Those blockers limited the investor’s ability to convert securities or exercise warrants to the extent doing so would cause it to exceed a 9.99% beneficial ownership threshold. As a result, the investor never became a greater-than-10% beneficial owner for purposes of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the blockers were ineffective because they could theoretically be amended by mutual agreement and that unsettled securities trades temporarily increased the investor’s beneficial ownership. The decision provides guidance for issuers and investors that routinely rely on beneficial ownership blockers in structured equity transactions.
Background
In early 2023, BBB entered into an equity financing agreement in which the investor acquired convertible preferred stock and warrants. The transaction documents included customary beneficial ownership blockers prohibiting the investor from converting preferred stock or exercising warrants to the extent doing so would cause it to beneficially own more than 9.99% of BBB’s outstanding common stock. Following BBB’s Chapter 11 filing, its litigation successor alleged that the investor became a greater-than-10% beneficial owner by repeatedly converting securities, selling the resulting common stock, and converting additional securities. The plaintiff sought disgorgement of more than $310 million in alleged short-swing profits under Section 16(b).
The Second Circuit’s Decision
The Second Circuit concluded that the investor never became a greater-than-10% beneficial owner because the contractual beneficial ownership blocker prevented it from converting its securities or exercising its warrants in a manner that would cause its beneficial ownership to exceed the 9.99% cap. The court also noted that trading records showed the investor’s beneficial ownership remained below the contractual threshold throughout the relevant period. Accordingly, the investor was not subject to Section 16(b) liability on the theory that it was a greater-than-10% beneficial owner. The plaintiff argued that the blockers should be disregarded because the governing agreements could theoretically be amended by mutual agreement. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, holding that the possibility of a future amendment did not negate an existing contractual restriction. Because the investor could not unilaterally waive or disregard the blocker, the court concluded that the ownership limitation remained effective during the relevant period.
The plaintiff also argued that the investor temporarily exceeded the 10% threshold because shares it had agreed to sell remained unsettled while newly converted shares were added to its holdings. The Second Circuit rejected that theory, explaining that beneficial ownership depends on an investor’s voting power or investment power over securities.
Takeaways
The Second Circuit’s decision confirms that:
- properly drafted and complied-with beneficial ownership blockers may effectively prevent an investor from becoming a greater-than-10% beneficial owner for purposes of Section 16(b);
- the possibility that contractual provisions could later be amended by mutual agreement does not, by itself, render those provisions ineffective; and
- once an investor enters into a binding sale transaction, it generally no longer has investment power over those shares for purposes of determining beneficial ownership, even if settlement has not yet occurred.
The decision also provides helpful authority supporting the effectiveness of properly drafted beneficial ownership blockers commonly used in PIPE transactions, registered direct offerings, convertible preferred financings, warrant issuances, and other equity transactions.




