The Credit Roundtable, an association of fixed income investors, recently published a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) expressing concern with potential changes to the SEC’s debt tender offer rules. The Credit Roundtable explained the practical difficulty that the existing regulatory framework creates for institutional investors and proposed changes.
To understand the current framework for debt tender offers, it is best to think of three categories of debt tender offers: standard offers, five-day offers and convertible bond offers. Currently, all tender offers are subject to Regulation 14E. Pursuant to 14e-1(a) under Regulation 14E, all tender offers (except for five-day offers, as explained below) must remain open for 20 business days. In 2015, the SEC granted no-action relief for debt tender offers for “any and all” debt securities of a particular class that meet certain conditions to remain open for only five days, notwithstanding Rule 14e-1(a). One of the conditions is the “Guaranteed Delivery Procedure Condition,” which requires the offeror to permit tenders by guaranteed delivery procedure prior to the offer’s expiration if the holder certifies that they beneficially own the tendered securities and that delivery thereof will be made no later than the close of business on the second business day following the offer’s expiration. Finally, tender offers for convertible debt securities are subject to the additional rules that Rule 13e-4 imposes on tender offers for equity securities.
A number of trade groups and bar associations have provided comments on the tender rules. The Credit Roundtable letter expresses concern that the SEC Staff might consider changes to the tender offer process that may shorten the time decisionmakers at institutional investors have to make an informed choice on whether to tender. The letter explains that the decision-making period in a five-day offer is actually shorter than it seems. Generally, decisionmakers do not receive tender offer notifications until after DTC notifies the institution’s internal corporate actions team through the Automated Tender Offer Program (“ATOP”) and the corporate actions team notifies decisionmakers. This process can take several days. Custodians that hold debt securities for institutional investors often set deadlines that may be several days before the tender offer deadline or expiration date. By the time a tender offer notification makes its way from the issuer to a decisionmaker, the decisionmaker may have as little as one business day to make a decision. The letter expresses concern that shortening this time period or subjecting Standard Offers to a shorter timeline would undermine the SEC’s intent when it adopted the tender offer rules, i.e., to decrease the likelihood of “hasty, ill-considered decision making.” To balance these concerns with the SEC’s interest in affording issuers of debt securities additional flexibility, the Credit Roundtable proposes one rule change to each category of debt tender offer:
- Standard Offers: Allow ten-business-day tender offers at a single price. By way of background, standard offers generally include a ten-business-day “early tender period” during which tendering holders are paid an early tender premium. The Roundtable argues that because settlement may not happen until after the full tender offer period ends, even though almost all tenders are effected during early tender periods, most tendered bonds “are effectively locked up for two additional weeks with no benefit to bondholders or the issuer.” Permitting ten-business-day offering periods for standard offers would balance issuers’ interest in speed with holders’ need for time to review.
- Five-Day Offers: Eliminate the Guaranteed Delivery Procedure Condition so offerors need not worry about settlement uncertainty, a change the Roundtable believes is feasible thanks to “modern tender mechanics such as ATOP,” DTC’s Automated Tender Offer Program.
- Convertible Bond Offers: Create an exception from the equity tender offer rules for deep out-of-the-money convertible debt securities. Since deeply-out-of-the-money convertible debt securities “function as debt securities,” the Roundtable argues for treating them like straight debt securities.

