Given the continued and growing interest in special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) as a means of accessing private market investments, we are publishing a series of posts that examine different aspects of these structures. This is our third post in the series, exploring structuring and regulatory issues that arise when SPVs are formed to invest in other SPVs.
In our prior posts on single-investment SPVs, we discussed the primary structures SPVs use to accomplish their objective of providing indirect or synthetic exposure to their reference investment. Adding another level of abstraction, some sponsors form SPVs that invest in other SPVs. In this post, we consider the legal and regulatory issues these double-layer structures present.
Throughout this series, we considered the fictional company TechCo and hypothetical SPV structures that would invest either directly or synthetically in TechCo’s common stock. Now consider the following scenario:
- SPV-1, a Delaware limited partnership, holds TechCo common stock it acquired using the proceeds from the offer and sale of SPV-1 limited partnership units to SPV-1’s limited partners.
- SPV-1 owns 1% of TechCo’s outstanding common stock.
- SPV-2, also a Delaware limited partnership, purchases limited partnership units of SPV-1 using the proceeds from the offer and sale of SPV-2 limited partnership units to SPV-2’s limited partners.
- SPV-2 owns 10% of the limited partnership units of SPV-1.
- TechCo has a valuation of $10 billion.
In this scenario, SPV-1 owns $100 million of TechCo common stock. SPV-2 does not own any TechCo common stock but does have an indirect interest in $10 million of TechCo common stock, i.e., SPV-2 has an indirect 0.1% interest in TechCo.
Through the Looking Glass
As mentioned in our introductory post, sponsors must consider when to look through entities, how to treat investors that rely on similar exemptions and whether affiliated vehicles should be integrated. The Section 3(c)(1) exemption under the Investment Company Act generally limits a fund to no more than 100 beneficial owners. One motivation to form a double-layer structure is to work around that investor cap: if SPV-1 already has 99 investors, it might have headroom to admit SPV-2 as a limited partner and thereby provide economic access to several additional investors (SPV-2’s LPs) who would not be able to invest directly as SPV-1 LPs. However, the look-through rules are complex, and a full discussion of them is beyond the scope of this series. If SPV-1 and SPV-2 both rely on the Section 3(c)(1) exemption and the look-through rules require SPV-1 to “look through” SPV-2 to its beneficial owners, then the LPs in SPV-2 could count against SPV-1’s 100-beneficial owner limit, and SPV-1 risks inadvertently exceeding that limit. For this reason, it is important for SPV planners and their legal counsel to pay careful attention to the complex and often intricate provisions of the Investment Company Act and related SEC rules governing fund formation.
Double Your Layers, Double Your Fees
Each SPV in the double-layer structure will be governed by a limited partnership agreement, which provides for management fees and carried interest. Any investment income earned on TechCo common stock by SPV-1 will first be used to pay the management fee due to its general partner, with the remainder being split between the LPs and the GP based on the GP’s carried interest. As with any investment vehicle, these fees create drag on returns. Doubling down on drag, SPV-2 generally will also charge management fees and carried interest of its own.
To understand how this compounds the drag on investment returns, consider a 20% increase in the value of TechCo common stock and assume the GPs of each of SPV-1 and SPV-2 charge a 5% management fee and 20% carry, fee rates that the Wall Street Journal reports are not uncommon in single-investment SPVs. SPV-1’s investment income would be $20 million (a 20% return on its underlying $100 million investment in TechCo common stock). After paying $5 million in management fees and $4 million in carry, SPV-1 is left with $11 million to distribute to its LPs, who initially invested $100 million, which represents an 11% return. Since SPV-2 holds 10% of the limited partnership units in SPV-1, its ratable share of this investment income is $1.1 million. After SPV-2 pays $500,000 in management fees and $220,000 in carry, it is left with $380,000 to distribute to its LPs, who initially invested $10 million, which represents a 3.8% return. The following chart illustrates the difference in the allocation of underlying investment income among direct owners of TechCo common stock, LPs in SPV-1 and LPs in SPV-2:

Finders’ fees can drag investor returns even further in a double-layer structure. If a finder charges a fee for sourcing TechCo common stock for SPV-1, SPV-1 has less capital to invest in TechCo. Likewise, if a finder subsequently charges a fee for introducing SPV-2 to SPV-1, that reduces SPV-2’s investable capital. For this reason, it is important for the planners of a second-layer SPV and their legal counsel to consider carefully the management fees, carry, placement fees and finders’ fees when deploying capital into first-layer SPVs.
Where’s the Beef?
A hot topic in multi-layer single-investment SPVs lately has been transparency regarding ownership. It has recently been reported that the SEC is increasingly asking registered funds that offer exposure to private companies to prove their ownership interests in those companies.
Following the SpaceX IPO, some second-layer SPV investors who expected to reap the financial rewards of the IPO pop instead discovered, to their chagrin, that they had missed out. Recent class action litigation alleges that a second-layer SPV sold its ownership interest in the first-layer SPV without the knowledge or consent of its investors. The organizational documents for single-investment SPVs typically provide that the underlying security (the reference security for first-layer SPVs or the first-layer SPV units for second-layer SPVs) is to be sold or distributed only following a liquidity event with respect to the reference security, such as an IPO or merger.
Returning to our two-SPV scenario above, consider what would happen if SPV-1 sold its TechCo shares without the knowledge or consent of its LPs. Investors in SPV-2 would lose their economic exposure to TechCo, but what recourse would they have? SPV-2’s LPs have no direct economic or legal relationship, or privity of contract, with SPV-1 or its general partner. They would be fully dependent on SPV-2 and its GP to initiate legal action against SPV-1.
For these reasons, second-layer SPV planners and their legal counsel need to carefully diligence the first-layer SPV’s ownership, draft strong protections against early exits and monitor for compliance after investment. Likewise, investors in second-layer SPVs should understand the disclosure and reporting obligations of the vehicles they invest in.
The Long Arm of the Claw
In a typical fund structure, the limited partnership agreement (“LPA”) or other governing documents will include a “clawback” provision, i.e., an obligation for the general partner to return previously received carry or performance-based income in excess of what it would have been entitled to under the terms of the partnership. For example, if a general partner is paid $100,000 in carried interest during the life of a fund whose LPA entitles the GP to 20% of investment profits, and it is determined when the fund winds down that the fund earned only $400,000 in investment profits (which would entitle the GP to $80,000 in carried interest), the GP will be required to return $20,000 for the benefit of the LPs.
Applying this concept to the double-layer structure, consider a situation where SPV-1’s GP is required to repay excess carry to SPV-1’s LPs. Since SPV-2 is an LP in SPV-1, it would be entitled to a pro rata portion of the SPV-1 clawback. However, since SPV-2’s LPs have no direct legal or economic relationship, or privity of contract, with SPV-1 or its GP, the SPV-2 LPs may have difficulty enforcing the clawback provision of SPV-1’s LPA if SPV-2’s GP does not do so on their behalf. This is yet another factor for second-layer SPV planners and investors to consider in diligence.

